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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CASE OF
PRIVATE WADSWORTH.
The recent strike of the anthracite coal miners raised
many doubts in the minds of thoughtful men. The, right
of the coal-carrying roads to own the mines, their right
to combine, the possible extent of public regulation of the
business of coal mining, and even the condemnation of the
mines by the state, are some of the topics which have demanded attention.
When the civil powers failed in the maintenance of order
in the coal regions, and it became necessary for the governor
of the state to call out the militia, another sort of question
suggested itself, viz: what was the status of the military
under the circumstances. And when, in consequence of the
orders of the general commanding in the region, a citizen
having no connection with the disorder was shot by a militiaman and killed, the inquiry naturally arose, whether such
orders were within the authority or power of the general to
give; and whether they constituted any protection to the
private who did the shooting. Some thought upon these
points at the time of the occurrence, led the writer to turn
to the books for light, and he has ventured to give the result
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of his study of the status of the military in relation to the
civil arm in time of riot, mob violence and insurrection.
It will perhaps conduce to clearness if the facts are first
shortly stated and the conclusions of law subsequently deduced and applied to them. The only available authoritative sources from Which to obtain the facts, are the orders
issued by the governor and the commanding general, and
the evidence given before the coroner after the shooting
occurred.
It is matter of common knowledge that the situation at
,Shenandoah, Schuylkill County, was very grave throughout
the strike. The sheriff lost control of the situation and called
upon the governor for troops. They were sent. Subsequently the conditions became more dangerous and the governor ordered out the whole of the National Guard of Pennsylvania. On October 6, Governor Stone issued General
Order No. 39, which ran as follows:
"I. In certain portions of the counties of Luzerne, Schuyl"kill, Carbon, Lackawanna, Susquehanna, Northumberland
"'and Columbia, tumults and riots frequently occur and mob
"law reigns. Men who desire to work have been beaten
"and driven away and their families threatened. Railroad
"trains have been delayed and stoned, and tracks torn up.
"The civil authorities are unable to maintain order and
"have called upon the governor and commander-in-chief
"of the National Guard for troops. The situation grows
"more serious each day. The territory involved is so exten"sive that the troops now on duty are insufficient to prevent
"all disorder. The presence of the entire division, National
"Guard of Pennsylvania, is necessary in these counties to
"maintain the public peace. The major-general command"ing will place the entire division on duty, distributing them
"in such localities as will render them most effective for pre"serving the public peace. As tumults, riots, mobs and dis"order usually occur when men attempt to work in and about
"the coal mines, he will see that all men who desire to work,
"and their families, have ample protection. He will protect
"all trains and other property from unlawful interference,
"will arrest all persons engaging in acts of violence and
"intimidation. and hold them under guard until their release
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"will not endanger the public peace, and will see that threats,
"intimidations, assaults and all acts of violence cease at once.
"The public peace and good order will be preserved upon all
"occasions and throughout the several counties, and no inter"ference whatsoever will be permitted with officers and men
"in the discharge of their duties under this order. The dig"nity and authority of the state must be maintained, and her
"power to suppress all lawlessness within her borders be
"asserted."
Under this order the Eighteenth Regiment, N. G. P., was
stationed at or near Shenandoah. The house of Barney
Bucklavage, at No. 1118 West Coal street, had been dynamited twice, and as a result, the general in command issued
special orders on October 8, part of which is as follows:
"At 5.30 p. m. a detail of one corporal and six men should
"be put at the house of Barney Bucklavage, No. II 18 West
"Coal street; this house was dynamited on the night of
"October 6 and is occupied by a woman and four small
"children, and for the present I deem it best to guard it; my
"instructions to the guard have been that they shall keep a
"sentry on at the front door sitting inside the house with
"the door ajar, and one sentry sitting just outside the rear
"door under the porch, and if any attempt is made to dyna"mite them, or they are shot at or stoned, or any suspicious
"characters prowl around, particularly in the rear of the
"house, who fail to halt when directed by the guard, the
"guard shall shoot and shoot to kill."
About 11.20 o'clock in the evening of October 8, private
Wadsworth was posted as the sentry in the front yard of
the house, just in front of the door, under orders to halt all
persons prowling around or approaching the house, and if
the persons so challenged failed to respond to the challenge
after due warning, "to shoot, and shoot to kill."
According to the testimony given before the coroner,
Wadsworth about 11.3o o'clock discovered a man approaching along the side of the road nearest the house and called
"halt." The man continued to advance, and Wadsworth
called "halt" again, but the man paid no attention to the
order. Wadsworth then tapped lightly on the door and said,
"corporal of the guard." He then called "halt" and again
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"halt." Wadsworth testifies that the man had turned and
was coming toward the gate, and when he last called "halt,"
had opened the gate. He fired, the man screamed and fell
dead. The corporal of the guard saw the flash of the shot,
but nothing else. A number of witnesses testified that when
found the dead man lay from three to six feet outside the
gate.
There had been no disturbance in the neighborhood of the
house and Wadsworth testified that the man he shot was the
first and only man he saw coming along the road that night;
that he was about five yards distant when the shot was fired.
Jacob Durham, a brother of the dead man, swore that his
brother was slightly deaf before he went to war, but was
more so after his return. Mrs. Mary Shore testified that
she saw the soldiers pick up the body and that it was not
near the gate then. Thomas Shore testified that he found
blood marks in the road, after the shooting.
The coroner's jury found as follows:
"We find that the said William Durham came to his death
"October 8, 1902, at Shenandoah, at a place called ii8
"West Coal street, by a gunshot wound inflicted by Arthur
"Wadsworth, of Company A, Eighteenth Regiment, N., G.
"P., and from the evidence before us and examination of
"the premises on West Coal street, we believe said shooting
"was hasty and unjustifiable, and we recommend that the
"matter be placed in the hands of the District Attorney for
"investigation."
As a result of this verdict, a warrant was issued for the
arrest of Wadsworth. The military authorities refused to
give him up. ' After his return home he was arrested, and
has applied for a habeas corpus to release him from the
custody of the civil authorities.
Probably if this deplorable occurrence had been avoided,
no doubts would have been raised as to the status of the
military during the strike. But when it is asserted that a
peaceable citizen, not proved to have been guilty of any evil
act or intent, may be shot in the public highway, without
previous proclamation or notice that he is forbidden to go
therein, and that he who did the shooting is amenable only
to his military superiors and not to the machinery of the
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civil law provided for investigating such occurrences, there
must be some good reason why such an extraordinary thing
is true. And that reason must be found in some rule of law,
which makes the military a higher form of law than the civil.
It is proposed to examine into the doctrines regarding
military and martial law, to discover if there be any principle
upon which such immunity from civil responsibility can be
grounded.
We may premise our discussion of the problems raised

by this occurrence, by some observations on the relations
of the civil and military jurisdictions. There is a belief,
common to layman and lawyer, that the arm of civil power
does not reach the soldier. Nothing could be more fallacious.1 In England the soldier, as a soldier, is governed
and tried by a code enacted by Parliament and known as the
"The citizen on becoming a soldier does not merge his former character in the latter. He releases himself from none of his former duties
and obligations. Instead of this he engages to perform other duties
in addition to those with which he was formerly charged. He submits
himself to a special code of laws, which does not supersede or abrogate that to which he was formerly subject, but which, on the contrary, binds him by a new tie to the very same authority, which, as a
citizen he previously obeyed. With regard to the civil powers and
authorities, he stands in precisely the same position he formerly occupied. They lose none of their rights and prerogatives. . . . There is no
principle more thoroughly incorporated in our military as well as in
our civil code, than that the soldier does not cease to be a citizen and
cannot throw off his obligations and responsibilities as such. The
general law claims supreme and undisputed jursidiction over all. The
military law puts forth no such pretensions. It aims solely to enforce,
on the soldier, the additional duties he has assumed. It constitutes
tribunals for the trial of breaches of military duty only. . . These
two systems of law can in no case come into collision. Their spheres
of action are different. The military code commences where the
other ends. It finds a body of men, who besides being citizens, are
also soldiers. Their rights and duties, in the former capacity, it
finds already well settled and established; but in their latter capacity,
their duties are undefined, their rights are unascertained until it steps
in to fill the vacuum, to place the soldier as completely under cover
of law, and to guard him as securely against tyrannical and arbitrary
power in his military as in his civil character. The one code embraces
all citizens, whether soldiers or not; the other has no jurisdiction over
any citizen as such."--O'Brien, Military Law, pp. 26 and .27.
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mutiny act.2 But the fact that he has his own code, does not
relieve him from trial for crime, by the common law courts.3
This is well illustrated by the famous case of Governor
Wall, 4who just prior to leaving Goree for England, called
his troops out on parade, formed them in a circle, and taking
a private named Armstrong out of their midst had him
bound to a cannon and given eight hundred lashes with a
one-inch rope. As a result Armstrong died. Wall was
indicted in England, twenty years later, for murder.
His defence was that Armstrong was a leader of a mutiny;
that swift and drastic action was necessary; that he held a
conference with his officers before punishing the culprit,
and that this conference was the best and only sort of courtmartial he could hold under the circumstances; that he had
no idea the punishment would be fatal in its result. The
evidence of the prosecution tended to show that there was no
mutiny and that Wall had been guilty of the most summary
and brutal conduct. The court charged the jury that if
there was no mutiny, there was no ground for the proceedings, and if there was a mutiny then Wall was bound to give
some consideration to Armstrong's side of the case before
inflicting punishment, and instructed them to inquire whether
this was done, and lastly asked them to inquire whether Wall
acted with malice. If they found there was no mutiny, or
'

Prior to the mutiny acts, the army was governed by rules made

from time to time by the king, by advice of the marshal and constable
of his realm: Hale's Hist. Com. Law, 42.
'Coke Inst. III, c. 7: "If a lieutenant or other that hath commission
of martial authority in time of peace, hang or otherwise execute any
man by colour of martial law, this is murder, for this is against Magna
Charta, c. 29." See also, Hale's Hist. Com. Law (sixth edition,
London, 382o), 45: "The common law, and the judges of the courts
of common law, have the exposition of such statutes or acts of parliament, as concern either the extent of the jurisdiction of those courts,
whether ecclesiastical, maritime or military, for the matters depending
before them. And, therefore, if those courts either refuse to allow
these acts of parliament; or expound them in any other sense, than is
truly or properly the exposition of them;-the king's great court of
common law, who, next under the king and his parliament, have the
exposition of those laws, may prohibit and control them. To the same
effect, Comm. v. Small, 26 Pa. 31.
'28 State Trials, 51.
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no hearing of the prisoners defence, and if there was
malice, then Wall's action was murder. A verdict of guilty
was returned and Wall was hanged. 5 It is admitted that
an English soldier may sue another for a civil wrong.6
The law is equally clear in this country. In the leading
case, United States v. Clark,7 a soldier was indicted in the
District Court of the United States for murder in shooting
and killing a fellow soldier who was attempting to escape
from military prison. On a habeas corpus, it was contended
for the prisoner that the court had no jurisdiction, (I) because he was a soldier, and hence, not liable in a civil court
for the murder of another soldier; and (2) because a courtmartial had been convened, had passed upon his case, and
had found him not guilty.
The court cited two federal cases wherein cognizance had
been taken of such offences," and overruled the first point in
the following language: "In view of the fact that this was a
homicide committed by one soldier, in the performance of
his alleged duty, upon another soldier, within a military
reservation of the United States, I had at first some doubt
whether a civil court could take cognizance of the case at
all; but as crimes of this nature have repeatedly been made
the subject of inquiry by civil tribunals, I have come to the
conclusion that I ought not to decline to hear this complaint.
Indeed it is difficult to see how I could refuse to do so without abdicating that supremacy of the civil power which is a
fundamental principle of the Anglo-Saxon polity."
The second point was answered in the following manner:
"In this connection it is urged by the defence that the finding of the court of inquiry acquitting the prisoner of all
blame is a complete bar to this prosecution. I do not so
regard it. If the civil courts have jurisdiction of murder,
notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction by court-martial
of military offences, it follows logically that the proceedings
"See also Axtells Case, Kelyng, 13.
'Keightly v. Bell, 4 Fost. & Fin. 763.
T3

Fed. 710.

' U. S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 61; U. S. v. Carr, i Woods, 48o.
'To the same effect, U. S. v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 2o9; Riggs v.
State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 85; U. S. v. Greiner, 4 Phila. 396 (semble);
In re Fair, ioo Fed. 149.
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in one cannot be pleaded as a bar to proceedings in the
other; and if the finding of such court should conflict with
the well-recognized principles of the civil law, I should be
' 1
compelled to disregard it."
O

The same lIw holds with regard to the criminal liability
of a soldier bf the United States in a state court, if he commits a crime within its jurisdiction."
The cases in federal and state courts holding an officer
or soldier civilly liable for going beyond his rights in the
treatment of the person or property of a citizen are quite
12
numerous.
But perhaps the most striking case of the assertion of the
supremacy of the civil courts over the military,-after the
termination of hostilities and in the country whose army has
the prisoner in custody,-is Wolf Tone's case.13 Tone was
a famous Irish agitator, and was advised that as he was suspected of treason he had better leave the country. He fled,
and finally landed in France. He was given a commission
in the French army, was captured on board a French vessel,
Citing Rankin v. State, 4 Cold. (Tenn) 145.

In Coleman v. Ten-

nessee, 97 U. S. 5O9, Mr. Justice Field (at p. 514) intimated that

Congress has power to render the military jurisdiction of offences
exclusive. This was, however, merely dictum, and is not believed
to be correct.
'Steiner's Case, 6 Ops. Atty. Gen. 413. In this case, Steiner, an
army surgeon, killed his commanding officer at an army post in Texas.
He was indicted in the Texas court and admitted to bail. A courtmartial was also summoned. The opinion of the attorney-general of
the United States was asked, with reference to Steiner's liability to
answer in the state court. The attorney-general said: "It must be
conceded that an officer or soldier of the American army, on his committing, within the United States, an act 'punishable by the known
laws of the land,' is subject to be tried and punished for that act,
according to those laws, i. e. by the competent, ordinary tribunals of
the state or territory in which the act was committed." At p. 416.
See also, Riggs v. State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 85; Coleman v. Tennessee,
97 U. S. 5o9; Peo. v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225.
"Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, i7o; Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How.
115; Despan v. Olney, i Curtis, 3o6; Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204;
McCall v. McDowell, i Abbott, 212; Holmes v. Sheridan, i Dill. 351;
McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234; Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257;
Teagardcn v. Graham, 31 Ind. 422.
U27

State Trials, 614.
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and taken to Dublin, where a court-martial was assembled;
he was accused of treason, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced
to death. Tone feared certain threatened indignities, at the
hands of the commanding general, in connection with his
execution. He therefore procured a petition to be presented
to the King's Bench, setting out the facts, and requesting
a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the court-martial
was without jurisdiction, as it was neither time nor place of
war, and the court of King's Bench was sitting to hear
criminal pleas. The prayer of the petition was granted.
The famous Curran moved for the writ in language both
eloquent and convincing. 14 The court granted the writ. To
the same effect are the American cases.1 5
"He said: "I do not pretend to say that Mr. Tone is not guilty of
the charges of which he was accused ;-I presume the officers were
honorable men ;-but it is stated in the affidavit as a solemn fact
that Mr. Tone had no commission under his majesty, and therefore no
court-martial could have cognizance of any crime imputed to him, while
the court of King's Bench sat in the capacity of the great criminal
court of the land. In times when war was raging, when man was
opposed to man in the field, courts-martial might be endured; but every
law authority is with me, while I stand-upon this sacred and immutable
principle of the constitution-that martial law and civil law are incompatible; and that the former must cease with the existence of the
latter. This is not the time for arguing this momentous question.
My client must appear in this court. He is cast for death this day.
He may be ordered for execution while I address you. I call on the
court to support the law. I move for a habeas corpus to be directed
to the provost-marshal of the barracks of Dublin, and Major Sandys to
bring up the body of Mr. Tone."
The following colloquy ensued:
Lord Chief Justice [Kilwarden].--"Have a writ instantly prepared."
Mr. Curran.-"My client may die while this writ is preparing."
Lord Chief Justice.---"Mr. Sheriff, proceed to the barracks and
acquaint the provost-marshal that a writ is preparing to suspend Mr.
Tone's execution; and see that he be not executed."
The reporter adds that the court awaited, in a state of the utmost
agitation, the return of the sheriff.
Mr. Curran.--"Mr. Tone's father, my lords, returns after serving
the habeas corpus; he says General Craig will not obey it."
Lord Chief Justice.-"Mr. Sheriff, take the body of Tone into your
custody. Take the provost-marshal and Major Sandys into your custody; and show the order of this court to General Craig."
Mr. Sheriff (who was understood to have been refused admittance
See, In re Egan, 5 Blatch. 3i9; Skeen v. Monkheimer, 2

Ind. 4.
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'In view of this uniform trend of decision, it must be adinitted that in ordinary times the civil is above the military
law; that the two ate separate and distinct and that the
former applies to soldier- and civilian alike, and disregards
the decrees of the latter. 10 Any other rule will substitute a
dictatorship for law, whenever a commanding general happens to think such a thing -wise; and the general will then
be acquitted of all fault by a military tribunal, appointed by
the same power which usurped the reins of government, and
whose finding cannot be revised by a civil court constituted
to enforce the constitution and laws of the state.
Is it true, then, that the common law ever loses its right
to pass upon the acts of the military? Is it possible that the
sole discretion and disposition as to the rights of men and
things, unquestionable anywhere, by any tribunal, is ever
vested in the commander of an army, or a court-martial
of his creation? I suppose the obvious reply is, that this is
the case when martial law exists; that then the common law
is unable to cope with the situation and gives way to its
complementary codej-the law-martial. If this be true, it
will be important for us to determine what this martial law,
so called, is defined to be.
There is a growing tendency to limit the term martial
law to the government of the citizens of a state by its own
army. Taken in this sense it is to be distinguished from
military law and from military government. Thus Chase,
C. J., in his dissenting opinion in Ex parte Milligan,lr said:
"There are under the Constitution three kinds of military
jurisdiction: one to be exercised both in peace and war;
another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the
boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and
at the barracks) returns.---"I have been at the barracks. Mr. Tone
having cut his throat last night, is not in a condition to be removed.
As to the second part of your order, I could not meet the parties."
Lord Chief .ustice.-"Let a rule be made for suspending the execution of Theobald Wolf Tone, and let it be served on the proper persons."
Tone lingered for some days, when he died, as the result of his selfinflicted wound.
1 So held in Comm. v. Small, 26 Pa. 31.
"4 Wall, 2.
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civil war within states or districts occupied by rebels treated
as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States,
or during rebellion within the limits of the states maintaining adhesion to the National Government, when the public
danger requires its exercise. The first of these may be called
jurisdiction under Military Law and is found in acts of
Congress prescribing rules and articles of war, or otherwise providing for the government of the national forces;
the second may be distinguished as Military Governient
superseding as far as may be deemed expedient, the local
law, and exercised by the military commander under the
direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress; while'the third may be denominated Martial Law Proper, and is called into action by Congress, or
temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot be invited,
and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where ordinary law no
longer adequately secures public safety and private rights.""8
All of the American text-writers make a similar division
of the subject of Military Law.19 It will perhaps be sufficient to quote a few words from the leading English writer
on the subject. Finlason says, "When, however, the military act in support of the executive, at common law, that is,
to suppress actual riot, or insurrection, they merely act in
aid of civil power, and are subordinate to it; whereas, under
'At p. 14r.

""Military law may be defined to be a body of rules and ordinances
prescribed by competent authority for the government of the military
state considered as a distinct community. It is an accumulative
law. The citizen on becoming a soldier does not merge his former

character in the latter. He releases himself from none of his former
duties or obligations. Martial law is something very different from
this ........
It is an expedient resorted to in times of public danger
similar, in its effect, to the appointment of a dictator. The general
or other authority charged with the defence of the country, proclaims
martial law. By so doing he places himself above all law."-O'Brien,
Military Law, 26. See also, DeHart, Military Law, 17; Winthrop,
Military Law, II, i; Birkhimer, Military Law, i; see also, Davis, Military Law, 5; 3 o n. I.

"Martial law is that rule which is established when civil authority in

74

THE CASE OF PRIVATE WADSWORTH.

martial law, the military have independent power of action;
for the whole district, in fact, is placed under military command and military discipline, the only authority being that
'20
of the commanding officer."
These quotations show sufficiently what modern writers
mean by martial law. The first question we must determine is whether such a thing existed in the coal regions of
Pennsylvania during the recent strike. No inquiry concerning such a question can afford to disregard history. The
writer proposes, therefore, in the first place to investigate
the instances, if any, of such law under the English Constitution, and whether in fact such a sort of law can exist -in
England, from which country we so largely derive our ideals
and theories of law, freedom and personal liberty. In the
second place, it will be well to determine whether martial
law may exist under the Constitution of the United States,
and whether any proper instances of its exercise, as above
defined, can be found in the history of our own country.
And, thirdly, we may discuss the possibility of its existence
under the constitution of Pennsylvania or those of the other
states of the Union. In the light of the conclusions reached
it will remain to consider the lawfulness of the orders issued,
as above cited, and to determine whether the private, acting
under such orders, is immune from criminal liability for his
acts.
I.

MARTIAL LAW IN

ENGLAND.

It seems never to have been doubted that the Crown has
the prerogative of meeting force with force. So when
rebellion breaks out, it is the right and duty of the Crown
the community is made subordinate to military either in repelling invasion or when the ordinary administration of the laws fails to secure the
proper objects of government. . . . It is exercised only over districts of that country whose military authorities enforce it."-Birkhimer, Military Law, 291.
"Martial law, as the term is used in this treatise, is military rule
exercised by the United States (or a state), over its own citizens (not
being enemies), in an emergency justifying it."-Winthrop, Military
Law, Vol. II, p. 37.
' "A Treatise on Martial Law" (London, 1866), Preface, p. v.
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to use the military arm for its suppression. If, in such
suppression life has to be taken, no one is to blame but he
who made the use of such extreme measure necessary. No
one thought that the execution of Wat Tyler was illegal.
Parliament and the courts never dreamed of interfering.
Such an insurrection had to be put down,-force used
against force,-and if the force used was no more than
necessary, no liability on the part of any one ensued. A rebel
must be treated as at war with the Crown and must be tried
and dealt with according to the summary laws of war.
This was martial law in a sense of that phrase, but not in
the sense in which it has been used above.
Later, in the reigns of Mary, Elizabeth and James, this
prerogative was abused in a most dangerous fashion. The
sovereign would declare that this or that person was a rebel
and should at once be put to death by martial law. Thus in
time of peace commissions sat to determine the guilt of
alleged rebels, and summarily put them to death. Charles
commenced his reign with such a flood of these commissions
that the people were at once aroused. 2 ' They presented (3
Car. I) the famous Petition of Right, setting forth the illegality of such trials by martial law, and praying that the
king would grant that hereafter no such commissions should
be created lest any of the king's subjects be put to death
contrary to law This petition the king granted. Strangely
enough the Long Parliament soon after authorized trial by
commission and a number of prominent men were so tried
and executed.
But, none the less, it had come to be recognized that
under the law of England, no martial law trial of a citizen
could take place on English soil in time of peace. And from
the time of the restoration to the present day, no such thing
has been attempted.
It is believed that no such thing as martial law, as above
defined, has existed in England proper since that time. And
yet there have been some violent riots, in which the troops
of which they fired
were called upon, and in at least one
22
magistrates.
the
from
orders
without
' The forms of several such commissions are given in Stephen's
"History of the Criminal Law of England," Vol. I,p. 29.
'The London Riots of 178o: Hough, Prec. Mil. Law, 571.
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Martial law has been declared in several British colonies
from time to time by proclamation of the governors. It was
done in the case of actual rebellions however. These cases
really have no bearing on our present inquiry, any more
than would the proclamation of martial law in Porto Rico
by the governor of that island in case of an uprising.
The only other instance of martial law in Great Britain
is that of the Irish Rebellion in 1803. Certain portions of
Ireland were in open rebellion; the civil authorities could
not enforce the law; nor could they enforce it with the aid
of the military, as was thought; hence an act of Parliament
was passed to meet the emergency.

This act 2 3 provided

that the Lord Lieutenant, from time to time, whether the
courts were open or not, might issue orders for taking the
most drastic measures to end the rebellion, to punish all who
aided and abetted the rebellion by martial law, by death or
otherwise, and to try all offences committed by court-martial.
The act contained also a declaration that nothing in it contained should be construed to take away the king's undoubted prerogative to proceed by martial law against open
enemies and traitors.

But as Stephen points out 2 4 such a

declaration as this cannot be construed to repeal the Petition
of Right and therefore must be taken to mean only that the
king may proceed by actual warfare to put down rebellion,
which no one has ever taken the trouble to deny, but of
which prerogative he was deprived by the protectorate, and
restored to him by Parliawhich prerogative was expressly
25
ment upon the restoration.
Even after such a sweeping act as the above, it was
thought necessary to pass an act of indemnity to protect
those who had carried out the provisions of the act.
The result of this review of English history is undoubtedly inconclusive. No case of martial law has arisen within
England since the Petition of Right. There have been
violent riots and uprisings and the troops have been called
upon, but it is clear that no such thing as martial law has
a43 Geo. III, c. 117.

" "History of the Criminal Law of England," Vol. I, p.
a 13 and i4 Car. II, c. 3; see Tytler, Mil. Law, 95.

211.
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prevailed, the troops being the mere assistants of the magistrates.26 But in the London Riots of 178o, the king issued
orders that the military should "act without waiting for
directions from the civil magistrates and use force for dispersing the illegal and tumultuous assemblies of the people."2' 7 Sir Edward Law, attorney-general (afterwards
Lord Ellenborough), in an opinion, furnished the Horse
Guards in i8oi, said that "in cases of great and sudden
emergency, the military, as well as all other individuals,
may act without

.

.

.

the presence of any peace officer

whatsoever" ;28 but this only means that every man is a
peace officer and must meet force with force, when riot or
insurrection arises.
Then again the colonial cases are not in point, they being
cases really of military government rather than martial law.
Lastly, if the case of the Parliamentary authorization of
martial law in Ireland is conclusive, then martial law may
only be declared by act of Parliament. But such act does
not relieve the military of civil liability, since an act of
indemnity was considered necessary for that purpose.
The doctrine of martial law was discussed at great length
by a committee of the House of Commons, which sat to
inquire into certain alleged unlawful acts in Ceylon. Sir
David Dundas, then judge-advocate general, in reply to
questions regarding the right of a governor to declare
martial law, said: "I say he is responsible just as I am
responsible for shooting a man on the king's highway, who
comes to rob me. If I mistake my man, and have not, in the
opinion of the judge and jury who try me, an answer to give,
I am responsible. My notion is that martial law is a rule of
necessity, and that when it is exercised by men empowered to
do so, and they act honestly, rigorously and vigorously, and
with as much humanity as the case will permit in discharge of
their duty, they have done that which every good citizen is
' Hough. Prec. Mil. Law, 571, 578, 584, 591.
T
Yet Lord Mansfield expressed the opinion that this was not martial law; that the soldiers were but part of the posse comitatus and
accountable for what they did in the courts. See 9 Parl. Hist. 1274,
1294.

'Hough,

Prec. Mil. Law, 5s8.
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bound to do.' 29 Stephen, in commenting on the above, says:
"The views thus expressed by Sir David Dundas appear to
me to be substantially correct. According to them the words
'martial law,' as used in the expression 'proclaiming martial
law,' might be defined as the assumption for a certain time,
by the officers of the Crown, of absolute power, exercised by
military force, for the purpose of suppressing an insurrection or resisting an invasion. The 'proclamation' of martial
law, in this sense, would only be a notice to all whom it
might concern that such a course was *about to be taken.
I do not think it is possible to distinguish martial law, thus
described and explained, from the common law duty which
is incumbent on every man, and especially on every magistrate, to use any degree of physical force that may be re-.
quired for the suppression of a violent insurrection, and
which is incumbent as well on soldiers as on civilians, the
soldiers retaining during such service their special military
30
obligations."
This seems to the writer a very different thing from the
definitions of martial law quoted above. As stated here it is
but another name for common law. 3' Every act done dur" Hough, Prec. Mil. Law, 539.
" Stephen, Hist. Crim. Law of Eng., Vol. I, p. 214. (Italics mine.)
He continues: "Thus, for instance, I apprehend that if martial law had
been proclaimed in London in 1780, such a proclamation would have
made no difference whatever in the duties of the troops or the liabilities of the rioters. Without any such proclamation the troops were
entitled, and bound, to destroy life and property to any extent which
might be necessary to restore order." He adds (p. 215) : "The
officers of the crown are justified in any exertion of physical force,
extending to the destruction of life and property to any extent, and
in any manner that may be required for the purpose. They are not
justified in the use of cruel and excessive means, but are liable civilly
or criminally for such excess. They are not justified in inflicting
punishment after resistance is suppressed, and after the ordinary courts
of justice can be reopened." See, also, a very able historical review
which reaches similar conclusions to those of Stephen, in 17 Law
Quarterly Review, 117.
" In the Manual of Military Law, issued with the sanction of the
British War Office, it is stated that martial law, as distinguished from
military law and the customs of war, is unknown to English jurisprudence; that the intermediate state between war and peace called by
continental writers a "state of siege," does not exist in English law;
...
. that while what is called martial law had been in former
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ing its continuance is not "at the whim of the commanding
officer," but is examinable by judge and jury in the civil
and criminal courts of the land. If this is all that is intended
by those who so strenuously contend that martial law may
exist in England, it is scarcely worth while to quarrel with
them over the use of a name. 32 Such writers as Finlason
and Birkhimer seem not to contend that martial law has
existed in England since the restoration, but that it may
exist upon proper occasion. If it be not enough to cite.
from Stephen, certainly Sir Matthew Hale and Lord Chief
Justice Cockburn ought to turn the balance in favor of the
33
proposition that there is no such thing under English law.
times proclaimed against disturbers of the public peace in England,
yet such a proclamation in no degree suspended the ordinary law, or
substituted any other in its stead, and amounted to no more than an
authoritative announcement of the existence of a state of things in
which force would be used against wrongdoers for the purpose of protecting the public peace. See Birkhimer, 318.
' Finlason, Commentaries upon Mart. Law, Introd. 24.
" Hale's Hist. Com. Law (sixth edition, London, 1820), 42: "This
indulged law was only to extend to members of the army, or, to those
of the opposite army, and never was so much indulged as intended to
be executed or exercised upon others. For others who had not listed
under the army, had no colour or reason to be bound by military constitutions, applicable only to the army, whereof they were not parts.
But they were to be ordered and governed according to the laws to
which they were subject, though it were a time of war." (Italics
mine.)
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn on the indictment of Colonel Nelson
and Lieutenant Brand for murder, for participation in the courtmartial which condemned Gordon and Clark during the negro rebellion
in Jamaica in i865, said: "A rebel in arms stood in the position of a
public enemy. You might kill him, refuse him quarter, and deal with
him in all respects as a public enemy. The jury must not confound
with martial law applied to civilians what had been commonly done at
many epochs of -English history in the treatment of rebels taken in
the field or in pursuit. . . . It was an egregious mistake to suppose that the punishment which might be inflicted if mutiny broke out
in a ship or in a regiment formed any part of the martial law. There
was one law paramount to all other laws, and this was, where illegal
violence is used you may defend yourself, and redress that violence
by any amount of force necessary for that purpose. . . . So, in
the case of a mutiny,-you might put it down by force. But that was
not martial law; it was part and parcel of the law of England. . .

8o

THE CASE OF PRIVATE WADSWORTH.

II.

MARTIAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES.

We come now to a much more difficult question. This
question is whether martial law can exist within the borders
of our own country under our form of government. Admittedly it can exist in an enemy's country, where our armies
are prosecuting a war. But then it is the law of war. It
is equally certain that military government may be exercised
over conquered territory. But the question is whether under
the Constitution, either Congress, or the President, or any
commanding officer of the army, is justified in proclaiming
martial law within the boundaries of the United States, and
over loyal supporters of the government.
No argument can be drawn from the arbitrary rule of the
Southern States during the Rebellion by Union commanders,
nor from the arbitrary governments established under acts
of Congress during the reconstruction period. For, though
the North technically denied the right of the South to secede,
yet in fact the South was granted belligerent rights. It was
enemy's territory. Hence martial law, or the rule of the
commanding general, was the only possible regulative, during invasion of Southern territory; and military government
was its only possible successor, upon the termination of
hostilities.
Cases of attempted extension of the military power over
loyal citizens in states unaffected with rebellion have been
few. They have been confined, altogether, so far as federal
troops are concerned, to cases arising during time of actual
war.
The first instance of such an attempt was that by General
Jackson in New Orleans in 1814-15.

But even here the

courts of Louisiana held his action illegal

4

and a federal

Now the question before the jury was whether for the suppression of
rebellion, you might not subject persons who are not actively engaged
in it, and whom you could not kill upon the spot, to a law which was
in this sense entirely exceptional, and to be carried into execution in
an exceptional way. There was no authority for any such proposition. Annual Register (N. S.) for 1867 (London, pp. 230, 234);
cited, Hare, American Constitutional Law, Vol. II, pp. 923-4. See also
Lord Loughborough, in Grant v. Gauld, 2 H. BI. 69. Sir Frederick
Pollock takes a similar view in an article in i7 Law Quarterly Review,
152.
"flohnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 0. S. 531.
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judge issued a writ of habeas corpus to release a publisher
who had printed an article reflecting on the conduct of
General Jackson, whereupon that doughty soldier promptly
arrested and confined the publisher. On the issuance of the
writ the judge was arrested, held a few days, and then sent
beyond the military lines. After the restoration of peace
the judge fined the general one thousand dollars for contempt. This was promptly paid. Congress, years afterwards, reimbursed the general. 35 It is clear that here the
will of the commanding general was not the only rule of
action, for neither state nor federal courts considered themselves bound by it.
This is the only instance, prior to the Rebellion, of a
declaration of martial law by a military commander, which
has come under the writer's notice. It is significant that
when Washington sent troops to quell the Whisky Insurrection in Pennsylvania, he was careful to instruct them to
3
operate strictly in aid of the civil authorities.
When we come to the civil war, we shall find numerous
declarations and proclamations of martial law by officers of
the Union army stationed in the rebel territory, as, for example, that of General Canby in New Mexico in I86I, 3 7 or
that of General Fremont in Missouri, which latter was
afterwards confirmed by the President by general order. 38
But, as remarked above, these cases furnish no argument
regarding martial law, for the confederacy was conceded
belligerent rights and the territory placed under military
rule was the enemy's country. Indeed, in every case, with
one exception, where martial law was attempted to be enforced in a loyal state, the courts, both federal and state,
animadverted against it, and refused to recognize its validity.3 Such instances fairly raised the question we are here
discussing.
SBirkhimer, 337 (n).
See 7 Howard, at p. 8o.
R. R. S., I, Vol. 4, p. 62; see Birkbimer, 371.
R. R. S., 1, Vol. 3, PP. 466-7; R. R. S., i, Vol. 8, p. 401.
See, for example, Exp. Merryman, Taney, 246; Exp. Milligan, 4
Wall. 2; Holmes v. Sheridan, i Dill, 351; Skeen v. Monkheimer, 21
'

Ind. 4; Teagarden v. Graham, 31 Ind. 422; In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359.
The same law was held by the Southern State Courts,---State v.

THE CASE OF PRIVATE WADSWORTH.

Martial law may proceed from one of two sources, the
executive or the legislative branch of government, including
in the term executive such proclamations or acts as have
originated with the secretary of war or a general commanding a district, as well as those ordered directly by the President. Let us examine first the power of the legislature to
declare such law.
It may be remarked at the outset, that no congressional
action looking to the declaration of martial law is, so far as
is known to the writer, on the statute books. The acts giving the President arbitrary power to establish military sway
over the conquered Confederate States, were passed in the
exercise of the power to govern vanquished enemies pending
the re-establishment of civil government. The statute coming nearest to the authorization of martial law is that of
April 20, 1871,4 o which declared that certain acts constituted
rebellion against the United States and authorized the
President in event of such acts, and in event of the administration of civil justice becoming impossible, to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus. This act was never passed upon by
the courts and was in force for only seventeen months.
Moreover, it did not go the length of authorizing the
President to override the civil tribunals, but, in fact only
empowered him to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
We shall have, therefore, to examine the powers of Congress as found in the Constitution for any authority to
declare martial law. And first, it must be mentioned that
nothing in the clauses relating to the legislative branch
ought to be construed as depriving a citizen of the privileges
guaranteed him in the various amendments, unless such
clauses are clear to that effect.
Now while the Congress is given in Art. I, § 8, the power
to make rules and regulations for the government of the
land and naval forces of the United States, this does not
infringe the fifth amendment, for that amendment runs:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherSparks, 27 Texas, 627; but see, Trammell v. Bassett, 24 Ark. 499. The
apparent exception is Mitchell v. Clarke, io U. S. 633.
W17 Stat. at Large, 13.
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wise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment
of a grand jury, except in cases arisingin the land or naval
forces, etc." Here, then, is express power to adopt a code
of military laws, distinct from those applicable to the citizen,
and a clear exception in the bill of rights to meet it.
Nowhere is there a similar clear declaration of the right
to prescribe a code of martial law for others than soldiers.
The third amendment, providing against troops being quartered in any house in time of peace without the owner's
consent; the fourth, securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, and providing that no warrants
shall issue except on probable cause, and upon oath; the
fifth, making indictment a prerequisite to criminal trials,
and guaranteeing that no one shall be deprived of his life,
liberty or property, without due process of law, and the
sixth, securing to the citizen a speedy trial by a jury of the
vicinage, etc., are absolute in their terms, save only the
exception, above noted; in the fifth. Art. III, § 2, provides
for trial by jury. It is not said that these shall be suspended
in time of war, or of insurrection or of public disturbance.
The farthest that the Constitution goes is to provide in Art.
I, § 9,that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. In E.x parte Milligan,4 1 however, Chief Justice Chase, delivering the opinion
of the dissenting minority,4 2 gave utterance to the following
dictum, which was not called for, even on the basis of decision taken by the minority for whom he spoke: "Martial
Law, is called into action by Congress

.

.

.

in times of

insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within
districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and private rights. We think
that the power of Congress, in such times and in such localities, to authorize trials for crimes against the security and
safety of the national forces, may be derived from its
constitutional authority to raise and support armies and
to declare war, if not from its constitutional authority
to provide for governing the national forces." 43 The SuWall. 2.
'Chase, C. J., Wayne, Swayne and Miller, JJ.
024

aAt p. 142.
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preme Court has gone very far, and properly so, in implying powers from the express grants of power to Congress in the Constitution, but it does not seem that the
clause in question is susceptible of this broad interpretation. Moreover, the writer does not know of any other
case than this, wherein the opinion has been expressed that a
power could be implied, which would take away an express
right granted to the citizen in another clause of the instrument. Certainly it is fortunate that the members of the
court holding such a dangerous view were in the minority.
It seems that the other powers granted in Art. I, § 8, such
as, to provide for the common defence and general welfare,
to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, 4" to
declare war, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, to provide for calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions, do not any of them, or collectively, override the amendments quoted. Nor do they
authorize the erection of a military rule over a loyal citizen
at home, at any time, higher than the civil tribunals of the
common law, which are secured to him forever by the guaranty of the fifth amendment that he shall not "be deprived
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
Such a view is taken by recognized text writers upon the
45
Constitution.
Let us now see whether there is any place under our Constitution for the creation of martial law by the chief executive or his subordinates in command of the troops of the
United States. On this point we are not embarrassed by the
paucity of authority. The question has been raised and
decided by both federal and state tribunals.
The leading case on the subject is Ex parte Milligan,"
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1866.
" In Ex parte Vallandigham, i Wall. 243, the Supreme Court in

fact held that a military commission was not a tribunal within the
meaning of this clause, and refused a certiorarito review its action
for that reason.
'Hare, American Constitutional Law, Vol. II, Lecture xliv, passim;
Pomeroy (Bennett's edition) 594.
"4 Wall. 2.
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In this case, Milligan, a citizen of the United States and of
the State of Indiana, was arrested at his home in the said
state, by order of the military commandant of the district
of Indiana, and incarcerated in a military prison. Later he
was placed on trial before a "military commission" convened by order of said commandant, charged with conspiracy against the government, affording aid and comfort to
rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices and violation of the laws of war. He was convicted and sentenced to
be hanged. Later he filed his petition in the Circuit Court
of the United States, setting out the above facts; he also
showed that while he was in custody and more than twenty
days after his arrest, a grand jury was convened in said
district and had adjourned without finding any indictment,
and had made no presentment whatever against him. He
also showed that he was in no way connected with the military or naval service. His prayer was that he might be
brought before the court, and either turned over to the
proper civil tribunal, or discharged, as provided by the act
of March 3, 1863. This was the habeas corpus act, which
provided that lists of all prisoners confined by military
authority were to be furnished to the United States Court
judges by the officials of the War Department, and it was
required" that in all such cases where the grand jury in
attendance upon any of these courts should terminate its
session without proceeding, by indictment or otherwise,
against any prisoner named in the list. the court should
forthwith make an order that such prisoner, desiring a discharge, should be brought before the court to be discharged,
on giving recognizance to keep the peace and obey the further orders of the court. If no lists were furnished, then the
prisoner was entitled to a discharge after twenty days' confinement, provided a grand jury had adjourned without
indicting him. The judges of the Circuit Court were divided
in opinion upon three questions, which they certified to the
Supreme Court: (i) On the facts as stated, ought a writ
of habeas corpus to be issued? (2) Ought Milligan to be
discharged? (3)Whether the military commission had jurisdiction legally to try and sentence Milligan? The majority
of the court answered the last question in the negative.
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They held that the constitutional guarantees are as binding
in war as in peace, and cannot be suspended during any of
the exigencies of government. That every trial involves
an exercise of judicial power, but that the Constitution
nowhere sanctions such a court as this military commission. The President could not establish such a court, for
he was under the Constitution, not over it. The proceeding
could not be justified under the "laws and usages of war,"
for "they can never be applied to citizens in states which
have upheld the authority of government and where the
courts are open and their process unobstructed." The court
then says that this is a deprivation of the right to trial by
jury. It then adverts to the argument "that martial law
covers with its broad mantle the proceedings of this military commission"; the proposition being, "that in a time
of war the commander of an armed force (if in his opinion
the exigencies of the country demand it, and of which he is
to judge) has the power, within the lines of his military district, to suspend all civil rights and their remedies, and subject citizens as well as soldiers to the rule of his will; and
in the exercise of his lawful authority cannot be restrained,
except by his superior officer or the President of the United
States." The court answers the argument thus: "The statement of this proposition shows its importance; for, if true,
republican government is a failure, and there is an end of
liberty regulated by law. Martial law established on such
a basis, destroys every guarantee of the Constitution, and
effectually renders the 'military independent of and superior
to the civil power'

.

.

.

Civil liberty and this kind of

martial law cannot endure together; the antagonism is
irreconcilable; and in the conflict, one or the other must
perish." The court went on to say that this decision was
not intended to deny the propriety of a declaration of martial
law when war exists in a community and the civil courts
are closed; that martial rule is the only sort there can be
when "the courts are actually closed and it is impossible to
administer criminal justice according to law" ;4 and only

" See

also, In re Egan, s Blatch. 319.
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so long as this condition lasts and in the actual locality of
war can it exist.
The two remaining questions the court answered in the
affirmative. 48

Four justices 49 concurred

in the result

reached by the majority, but for very different reasons.
The minority held that the whole case might well be settled
under the Act of 1863; that Milligan was within its terms
and hence entitled to his discharge; they therefore answered
the first two questions in the affirmative. But they held the
opposite to the majority concerning the third question.
They justified the right of Congress to authorize the President to appoint such a military commission by the powers
granted it to pass laws for the regulation of the land and
naval forces, to raise and support armies and to declare war.
They said: "Where peace exists the laws of peace must
prevail. What we do maintain is, that when the nation is
involved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is within the power
of Congress to determine in what states or districts such
great or imminent public danger exists as justifies the
authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes
and offences against the discipline or security of the army
or against the public safety." They then say that by passing
the Act of 1863, Congress impliedly said that military commissions were unnecessary and hence under the act the
tribunal was prohibited and illegal. 50
This case ought to settle the doctrine that there is no such
thing as martial law possible under the Constitution. But
there are others equally positive.
In i86i, the national government suspected a large num' Davis, J., wrote the majority opinion, concurred in by Nelson,
Grier, Clifford and Field, JJ.
*Wayne, Swayne and Miller, JJ., and Chase, C. J., who wrote the

opinion.
"The court went on to say "What we have already said sufficiently
indicates our opinion that there is no law for the government of the
citizens, the armies or the navy of the United States, within American
jurisdiction, which is not contained in or derived from the constitution.. . . . . Then follows the language cited supra pages 72
and 83.

88
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ber of citizens of Maryland of disloyalty and this disloyalty
showed itself in the attack by a mob on a Massachusetts
regiment passing through the city. By order of General
Scott, the commanding general of the district arrested the
marshal of police and the police board. He issued a proclamation stating he would uphold the civil authorities, but
treason and sedition would be suppressed. The courts
were open, and no civil officer had failed or been prevented
from serving process. Under orders, one Merryman, a
citizen of Maryland, was arrested by the military in Pennsylvania and sent to Fort McHenry. He presented a petition for a habeas corpus to Chief Justice Taney, who issued
a writ directed to General Cadwalader ordering him to
produce Merryman. This, the general refused, in a letter
stating that he had the power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, and had suspended it in this case. The chief justice
then issued an attachment against the general, but the marshal was barred out of the jail and could not serve it. Taney
then wrote an opinion adjudging the general guilty of contempt and certified it to the President. No action was taken
upon this opinion. He held that only Congress had the
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but that the
question here was much greater, viz: the power of the military to usurp the civil power and functions of the judiciary.

51

The supreme courts of two states have held that no such
thing as martial law existed in their borders during the
Rebellion, and that military arrest and confinement were illegal. 52

In the first of these cases a man arrested for par-

ticipating in a riot, the object of which was to prevent a
draft for the United States army, was granted a habeas
1

Ex parte Merryman, Taney, 246.

The Chief Justice said:

"I can

only say that if the authority which the constitution has confided to

the judiciary department and judicial officers, may thus, upon any pretext or under any circumstances, be usurped by the military power, at
its discretion, the people of the United States are no longer living
under a government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty and
property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose
military district he may happen to be found." (At p. 269.)
"In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359; Skeen v. Monkheimer, 21 Ind. 4.
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corpus. And in the second, similar action was taken in the
case of a man arrested on suspicion of having stolen goods,
the property of the United States.
State and federal courts have also held officers and soldiers liable in trepass at the instance of persons who have
been injured by the seizure of their bodies or their property,
in loyal territory, where the courts were open; and in doing
so, have reiterated the same doctrine as that laid down by
5 3
the court in Ex parte Milligan.

In view of these authorities it seems a safe assertion that
there is not under the United States Constitution any such
thing as martial law, in the sense of the arbitrary and discretionary government of loyal communities or citizens by
the military. The civil law is above the military. The
soldier is responsible thereto for his acts, save those acts
performed flagrante bello, or in the enemy's territory.
III.

MARTIAL LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA.

The discussion of this topic need not be long. All that
has been said relative to the Constitution of the United States
applies with equal force to that of Pennsylvania.
Art. I, § 6, provides that trial by jury shall be as heretofore and the right thereof remain inviolate.
Art. I, § 8, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
Art. I, § 9, gives one accused of crime the right to a speedy
public trial, and provides that no man shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers,
or the law of the land.
Art. I, § 12, reads: "No power of suspending laws shall
be exercised, unless by the legislature, or by its authority."
Art. I, § 22, "No standing army shall, in time of peace, be
kept up, without the consent of the legislature; and the military shall in all cases, and at all times be in strict subordination to the civil power."
In view of the above clauses it would seem clear that, not
" McConnell v. Hampton,

12 Johns. 234; Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns.
Ind. 370; Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142;
Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13; Holmes v. Sheridan, I Dill. 351, at p.

257; Griffin v. Wilcox,

356.
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only is no arbitrary military power authorized, but by § 22
it is strictly prohibited. No act of the military is free from
revision by the civil courts. These provisions are much
stronger than those of the federal constitution. The only
clause relating to the militia is Art. XI, § I, "The freemen
of this Commonwealth shall be armed, organized and disciplined for its defence, when and in such manner as may be
directed by law."' 54 Certainly it would be a liberal construc-

tion which could find in this any authority for a declaration
of martial law.
Nothing is added to the argument for martial law by
Art. IV, § 2, which provides: "The supreme executive
power shall be vested in the governor and he shall take care
that the laws are faithfully executed." This does not place
the governor above the law, but under it, he cannot therefore
suspend any portion of the law, unless some part of the
fundamental law gives him that right. Nor does Art. IV,
§ 7, making the governor commander-in-chief of the army
and navy of the commonwealth authorize martial law.
On principle, then, it is difficult to find any ground on
which to base the right of the legislature, much less of the
executive, to declare or exercise so-called martial law. It
apparently does not exist. Nor has the legislature attempted
to provide any general laws giving the governor such
55
power.
No intimation has been made from any quarter, that the
writer can find, to the effect that martial law ever has existed
in this state.
"The remainder of the section has no bearing on the question at
issue.
"The only acts which have come to the writer's knowledge are that
of April 28, 1899 (P. L. 133) § 5i, which provides, "When an invasion
of or insurrection in the state is made or threatened, or a tumult,
riot or mob, shall exist, the commander-in-chief shall call upon the
National Guard, and he may at his discretion, order any number of
men of the enrolled militia to be drafted, and may detail or commission
officers to organize the forces;" and the Act of June io,1893 (P. L.
443), § 2, which provides: "But the commander-in-chief shall have
power in case of war, invasion, insurrection, ripe or imminent danger
thereof, to increase the said force and organize the same as the
exigencies or the necessity may require."
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If we are to draw analogies from other states, but one
instance is known where anything approaching martial law
has existed in a state. This was the famous Dorr rebellion
in Rhode Island, which gave rise to the case of Luther v.
Borden,"8 in the Supreme Court of the United States. In
that case it appeared that a large number of the citizens of
Rhode Island were dissatisfied with the old frame of government (a charter from Charles II.) under which the
state was organized. There was great agitation for a new
constitution which culminated in a rump convention which
adopted a new instrument and then proceeded to overthrow
the old government by force of arms. The old legislature
passed an act declaring martial law, and the governor proclaimed the same. The insurgents were put down. Afterwards this suit was brought by a citizen of Massachusetts
against one of the soldiery of Rhode Island, in trespass, for
entering the plaintiff's house, and arresting him without
reasonable cause. The Supreme Court held that it could not
say which was the lawful government of Rhode Island. But
the question had been decided in favor of the old governrhent
by the Supreme Court of the state and this was adopted as
final by the Supreme Court of the United States. The question then arose whether the defendant was justified in entering phiintiff's house to arrest him. The court expressly refused to pass on the question whether martial law had been
established in the state,5 7 but found that the defendant was
justified in his action as the jury had found for him, and he
had apparently only done what seemed at the time reasonable
and necessary to put down insurrection against his state. Mr.
Justice Woodbury dissented, 8 taking the view that this was
an attempt to establish martial law for which there was no
justification in the law of the land.
From all this, the conclusion is inevitable that no such
thing as martial law (in any sense of the term which makes
it other than the common law) exists, or can exist under
the laws of England, of the United States, or of Penn"7 How. i.
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sylvania. If this be so, private Wadsworth cannot shield
himself from the process of the civil law on the ground that
he was acting under a different and independent code.
A citizen of Pennsylvania was shot, on the highway, in
Schuylkill County. The county was in a state of peace.
Certainly no one would declare that war existed there.
Certainly the military could not deal with citizens as enemies
and belligerents. Certainly Schuylkill County was not
enemy's territory. If this be true no such thing as the law
of war existed there. We have shown that martial law, if
by it is meant something other than the law of war, could
not exist there. The civil courts were open, criminal process
was being served every day. Only one presumption could
arise from the facts of the case. That presumption was
that a homicide had been committed "against the peace and
dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." Such a
homicide only one tribunal is authorized to investigate, and
that tribunal is the criminal court of Schuylkill County.
There is no escape from this conclusion. Wadsworth's act
may or may not have been a breach of military law as embodied in the articles of war. With that we have nothing
to do. Whether it was an offence agaifist the law of the
land, is a question that must be settled in the tribunal duly
constituted to administer that law.
I have carefully refrained from saying that Wadsworth's
act was criminal. That will be a question for a civil court
to decide. And two questions will be involved in that decision: (I) Was the order under which he acted a lawful
order, and (2) If it was illegal was its illegality patent to a
man of his station and in his situation? On the answers
to these two questions will depend the responsibility or
immunity of the accused.
I shall postpone, for discussion in another paper, these
two important questions.
Owen J. Roberts.

